Austerity operates not only as a set of economic policies but also as a cultural object within policy and popular debate

While there has been some recognition of the gendered impact of austerity, less attention has been paid to its specific implications for mothers. Drawing on a journal special issue, Tracey Jensen explains how through understanding austerity in cultural as well as economic terms, we might come to see its implications for our shared culture and sensibilities, as well as its specifically gendered dimensions. 

In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 recession and as the resultant austerity regime of reduced public spending began to be implemented, budget reviews demonstrated that it would be women who would bear the brunt. Fast forward to 2013 – with the second dip of recession a recent memory and a third dip imminent – the gendered effects of recession are impacting most acutely on one group in particular: mothers. The lattice of austerity policy – including reductions in public service provision, reduced levels in real terms of social security payments, frozen housing benefit and reductions in tax credit payments (amongst others) work together to have a compound effect on the support, income and security of mothers and especially those on low incomes, single mothers and those caring for disabled children. Changes in employment since the recession, such as the rise in short-term, part-time, insecure and precarious work, all impact disproportionately on those with caring responsibilities who are more likely to be snared within the ‘low-pay, no pay’ cycle of underemployment and poverty. The Equal Opportunities Commission estimated that some thirty thousand women a year lose their jobs as a result of becoming pregnant, and emerging evidence suggests that this maternal discrimination is currently increasing as employers seek to cut back, stall promotion and reduce workforces. Austerity is powerfully gendered, certainly, but it is particularly fixed upon women who have children.

Examining the public debate around austerity and gender, and extending it to consider more closely the implications and impacts of austerity upon families, the online journal Studies in the Maternal has published a Special Issue on the topic of ‘Austerity Parenting’. Drawing together work from sociology, critical social policy, community development, media and cultural studies, gender studies and economics, ‘Austerity Parenting’examines how the developing public narrative of austerity is connected to moral discourses of parenting. In particular we have asked how parents and parenting have been called upon by the architects of austerity, as both ‘to blame’ for the crisis (through ‘bad parenting’) and as being the solution (through ‘good parenting’) to an increasing variety of social and economic ills. ‘Parenting’ – articulated as moral and personal conduct and choices – is positioned as being the most important factor in determining a child’s life chances, more important than income, security, access to decent housing, healthcare, education, and so on. This moral narrative around good parenting distorts the wider debates we should be having about widening social and economic polarisation and stagnant social mobility.

An (initially tentative) rhetoric which has accompanied the implementation of austerity policies is that austerity is the necessary lean time which must follow on from the excessive spending of the previous Government. This rhetoric has grown bolder and is now echoed across policy and popular debate. We have spent too much money supporting those at the bottom, according to this narrative, and this spending has led to the breakdown of moral fibre and personal responsibility. This rhetoric rewrites the crisis of capitalism as being caused, not by the high-risk speculative financial sector, but rather by the ‘burdens’ of the welfare state and the ‘dependency culture’ it is said to create. Incredibly, social security levels (in 1979 worth 23% of the average income, now worth a paltry 11% and falling) are positioned as ‘too generous’ and as such enabling people to ‘choose’ a life on benefits. Those placed and blamed at the centre of this so-called dependency culture are ‘troubled families’, held to be chaotic, undisciplined, lacking in work ethic and responsibility; and importantly, to be transmitting these problems to their children who are doomed to repeat the cycle. These ideas are familiar enough to social scientists who remember Charles Murray’s claims about the underclass, which (despite a lack of evidence) exerted an enormous influence on policy in the early 1990s and as Imogen Tyler has documented dramatically re-emerged in media representations and political responses to the riots in August 2011. In the United States the underclass thesis led to the construction and circulation of figures such as ‘welfare queens’ and since the beginning of the current recession, we have seen a surge in similar stigmatized names for those in poverty, including ‘welfare scrounger’ and ‘feckless poor’.

But this particular moment is also bearing witness to the emergence of new terms and subjectivities designed to censure, accuse and condemn: the ‘skiver’ (vs striver) the ‘shirker’ (vs worker), the ‘feral parent’ and the ‘troubled family’. Such terms are wounding – they are designed to police, punish and hold in place, to individualise blame for stagnant social mobility and the conditions of poverty and worklessness. These ‘names for Britain’s poor’ are also arguably designed to produce or procure a consensus for welfare roll-back and deepening inequalities. Certainly, the enlivening and reanimating of such wounding terms alerts us to a profound poverty of imagination in policy debates. Emerging critical research demonstrates the inaccuracy of these emerging and moralising vocabularies and even more troubling the wilful ignorance of policy elites who insist on individualising poverty with no empirical evidence. This Special Issue contributes to this growing body of critical policy research, and seeks to explore the ways that austerity might be understood to operate not only as a set of economic policies but also as a cultural object within policy and popular debate, a subject-making discourse that is conferred, occupied and resisted, and as a web of socio-historical fantasies about the nation’s past and its possible futures. As such, this collection of work examines how austerity, in its connections with parenting, is circulating a particularly damaging vision of what causes poverty and social inequality and what our response could be. In proposing that social injustices are simply the result of bad choices made by lazy, irresponsible or workshy parents that ‘the rest of us’ can (and should) no longer afford, austerity parenting is reconfiguring our very sense of what public, mutual and collective sensibilities we should or ought to have towards one another.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/

About the Author

Tracey Jensen is a Lecturer at Newcastle University. Her research explores the classed and gendered intersections of contemporary parenting culture, and how these are reproduced across social, cultural, media and policy sites.

Osborne’s economic strategy has failed

These GDP figures are a disaster for the coalition government – politically as well as economically
When the rating agencies strip Britain of its AAA credit rating – as they almost certainly will – George Osborne’s strategy will be in complete tatters.

The strategy has failed. The public knows it. The International Monetary Fund knows it. The credit rating agencies know it. Even George Osborne knows it, although he can’t bring himself to admit as much.

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Here is a brief résumé of how things stand for the economy after two and a half years with the coalition government at the helm. National output has just contracted for the fourth quarter in the last five. The only quarter of 2012 in which the economy expanded was the one that contained the London Olympics, and unfortunately for the chancellor these sort of jamborees happen once every half century rather than once every three months.

During 2012 as a whole the economy registered no growth at all. Nothing. Zilch. A big fat zero. The level of gross domestic product is 3% below where it was when the recession started, a weaker performance than during the 1930s. Royal Bank of Scotland says the four-year performance of the economy between 2008 and 2012 is the weakest since the 1930s apart from post-war mobilisations.

Industrial production was to blame for the drop in output in the final three months of 2012, with factory output back to levels last seen in the early 1990s. Rebalancing is a pipedream. Unsurprisingly, the Treasury’s deficit reduction programme is well off track. This is an abysmal record.

Sure, there are all sorts of excuses that can be trotted out to explain away the fact that three years after the recession first ended GDP is still contracting. The crisis in the eurozone hasn’t helped. Rising commodity prices have raised business costs and acted as a brake on consumer spending.

But the government also sucked demand out of the economy by raising taxes, cutting welfare and by taking the axe to capital spending programmes. The blood-curdling rhetoric from Osborne in 2010 about Britain being a Greece in waiting had the entirely predictable effect of shredding consumer and business confidence.

So what happens next? Clearly, there is a risk that the first quarter of 2013 will also be negative. The economy is fundamentally weak and the heavy snow of the past week will not have helped.

Against this backdrop, there will be mounting pressure for further steps to get the economy moving. Ideally, action would come from the chancellor himself in the budget in the form of tax cuts and higher spending on small-scale infrastructure projects that can be started immediately.

In reality, changes to fiscal policy are likely to be small scale and cosmetic. Osborne will rely, as he has for the past two and a half years, on the Bank of England to do the heavy lifting. Further monetary easing looks inevitable, even though a combination of 0.5% bank rate and £375bn of quantitative easing has proved ineffective until now.

Politically as well as economically, these figures are a disaster for the government. It ensures the next few months will be spent debating whether the UK is heading for a triple dip and how soon the credit rating agencies will strip Britain of its AAA credit rating. When that happens – as it almost certainly will – Osborne’s strategy will be in complete tatters.

Removing rail subsidies could end up benefiting passengers

Posted: 22 Jan 2013 12:00 AM PST

Taxpayer subsidies to the rail sector have increased dramatically in recent years, with concomitant fare increases attracting widespread condemnation. Richard Wellings argues that structural reform to the railways is necessary to reduce the burden on the public purse. 

Taxpayer subsidies to the rail sector have reached astronomical levels. At £6 billion per year (including Crossrail), they have roughly trebled in real terms over the last twenty years. But the high rate of subsidy has not led to a reduction in fares, which have risen above the official rate of inflation in recent years. There are two main reasons for the large increase in taxpayer support. The first, and probably most important, is wasteful investment in loss-making new infrastructure. This is the direct result of policies that have aimed to increase public transport ridership and reduce car use.

For much of the post-war period, rail was viewed as a declining industry. Despite previous government efforts to suppress private road transport, the step change in efficiency resulting from the door-to-door transit of passengers and freight led to rapid growth in car and lorry traffic. A policy of ‘managed decline’ was therefore applied to the railways. British Rail received subsidies to keep the system going and there was some modernisation of key inter-city routes, but there was little enthusiasm to attempt to reverse the long-term trend.

This changed with the ascendancy of environmentalism within government. With their perspective grounded in radical egalitarianism, environmentalists not only objected to the pollution produced by private road transport; they also resented its social aspects – for example, the way that cars had become symbols of wealth and individual expression. The environmentalist agenda gradually captured university departments, various government bureaucracies, elements of the media and eventually national policy. In the mid-late 1990s, the road construction programme was cut back dramatically and a new strategy introduced. Private road transport would be deliberately discouraged with travellers encouraged to use buses, trams and trains instead.

For the railways this represented a sea change. The new policy meant that rail now had prospects for growth. It did not, however, change the fundamental economics. Since rail involves at least a three-stage journey, compared to the door-to-door convenience of private road transport, it remained unattractive for the vast majority of journeys.

Following privatisation, however, the policy of encouraging more rail travel appeared to be successful. Usage rose by around 50 per cent between 1997 and 2012, to levels not seen in peacetime since the 1920s. This reflected not just the impact of various deliberate policies, but also other trends such as a booming centralLondon economy for much of the period and demographic changes that led to a huge expansion of the ‘inner city’, pushing middle-class families out into the commuter belt to avoid poor schools, anti-social behaviour and fear of crime.

A combination of increased ridership and price controls produced severe peak-time overcrowding on several routes into London. Train operating companies have been constrained in their ability to smooth the peaks using the price mechanism, since season ticket fares on most London commuter journeys are regulated by the government. With a severely limited ability to deploy the price mechanism and other means to make more efficient use of existing rail capacity, the industry has increasingly focused on supplying new infrastructure to accommodate growth. This has proved hugely expensive, however. The final cost of the ongoing Thameslink 2000 upgrade, for example, is likely to be £6 billion. And the Crossrail scheme will cost £16 billion.

Since in commercial terms such projects are loss-making and would never be undertaken in their current form by the private sector, taxpayers have been forced to fund them. Accordingly, wasteful investment in new rail infrastructure is probably the largest single factor in the growth in taxpayer support in the post-privatisation era. Such investment has not been restricted to overcrowded routes in the South-East. The government also funds improvements for blatantly political reasons, in regions where there is little passenger demand. For example, it was recently announced that branch lines in South Wales would be electrified – at taxpayers’ expense, of course. The environmentalist agenda means that rail schemes get priority even though the government’s own cost-benefit analyses show that economic returns from road improvements are far higher.

The second major reason for the increased burden on taxpayers is the artificial structure imposed by the government on the post-privatisation rail industry. Historically, railways that developed in the private sector exhibited a high degree of vertical integration. This meant in practice that the same company owned the tracks and operated the trains, thereby avoiding the transaction costs associated with complex contractual arrangements between highly interdependent separate organisations.

Partly as a result of EU policy, Britain’s privatisation model has been very different, with one firm owning and maintaining the tracks, other firms operating the trains, and another set of firms leasing out the rolling stock. On top of all this complexity, the industry has been tightly regulated by various government agencies. The resulting fragmentation, combined with layers of bureaucracy, needlessly increased costs on the network. In addition, the high levels of regulation severely hindered entrepreneurship. As a result, the productivity-boosting innovations that have cut costs in other industries did not materialise on the railways. Indeed regulation is now so restrictive that private rail firms have effectively become subcontractors for the Department for Transport.

Structural reform would therefore be one of the best ways to reduce the burden on taxpayers. The government should stop prescribing the level of vertical integration and instead free the rail industry to become more efficient. This policy should be combined with a more rational approach to rail investment. A first step is to abolish price controls to remove artificial distortions to fare levels and consumer demand. The provision of new capacity should then be left to the private sector, without taxpayer support. It would make commercial sense to build new infrastructure in high demand locations where it could be funded by fare revenues or land development. Uneconomic projects driven by political motives and special-interest lobbying would no longer get built.

The economic case for phasing out subsidies is very strong. The taxes imposed on individuals and businesses to support the railways destroy jobs and hinder wealth creation in the wider economy. In addition, large parts of the rail industry could thrive without the bureaucratic micro-management that comes with government support. It may seem counter-intuitive, but removing rail subsidies could also end up benefiting passengers, by unleashing entrepreneurship and innovation on the railways that would drive down costs.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

Dr Richard Wellings is Head of Transport at the Institute of Economic Affairs.

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