The Spirit of ’45 – first look review | Film | guardian.co.uk

February 11, 2013February 11, 2013 dnmufcLeave a comment

Ken Loach’s account of the Labour postwar programme of nationalisation favours reminiscence at the expense of detail, but it certainly packs an emotional punch

Andrew Pulver

guardian.co.uk, Monday 11 February 2013 11.25 GMT

Labour of love … a still from Ken Loach’s The Spirit of ’45

No one can accuse Ken Loach of sitting on the fence. This account of Labour’s postwar general election victory and the subsequent programme of nationalisation is about as partial as they come. In Loach’s eyes this was a glorious time, when the experiences of the second world war were put to era-changing use on a home front still crippled as much by the depression of the 1930s as by military expenditure. The rush of socialist enthusiasm ended dangerously exploitative conditions in heavy industry, rebuilt lousy housing and established a free-to-all medical service.

The Spirit of ’45

Production year: 2013

Country: UK

Directors: Ken Loach

Alex Salmond and David Cameron’s incoherent referendum plans mean that they are unlikely to get what they want for either Scotland or the UK

February 8, 2013February 8, 2013 dnmufcLeave a comment

Posted: 06 Feb 2013 06:00 AM PST
An independence referendum is due to be held in Scotland in 2014, with another referendum being pledged by UK Prime Minister David Cameron on the country’s relationship with Europe in 2017. Jo Murkens and Peter Jones argue that in both referendums the options put before the electorate are likely to be exceptionally vague. The UK’s proposed new relationship with Europe is still largely unknown, and it is unclear what the precise nature of an independent Scotland would involve.

This article was first published on LSE’s EUROPP blog

Countries that are used to referendums on constitutional matters use them sparingly. The UK has no such constitutional requirement, but faces the possibility of having to deal with two such referendums within the space of a few years. The first referendum could see Scotland break away from the United Kingdom, the second could see the United Kingdom(which by then may or may not include Scotland) break away from the European Union.

The common issue to both Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond, and UK Prime Minister David Cameron, is political sovereignty. They both want more of it; Salmond wants to claim it from the UK, Cameron wants to claim it from the EU. In that narrow sense, they are both nationalists: Salmond a Scottish one, Cameron a British one. Both also want, they claim, to be good European citizens but have to contend with the problem that the European club they want to be members of has rules which conflict with their visions of the idealised version they imagine it should be. And the promotion of this idealised vision to their voters leads them both to political positions which are incoherent.

Scotland’s difficult road towards independence and EU membership

Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond and UK Prime Minister David Cameron Credit: Scottish Government (Creative Commons BY NC)

For the Scottish National Party (SNP) which was, until the advent of devolution in 1999, a minority fringe party, the ‘Independence in Europe’ policy was never subjected to serious examination. It was not much more than a political slogan used in political debate to counter the separatist charge levelled by opponents. The most that was done to develop this policy was to locate sympathetic European luminaries who gave the SNP helpful quotes asserting that upon independence,Scotland would move seamlessly into EU membership. It became an article of SNP faith that Scotland would be warmly welcomed into the happy European family, effectively countering ‘separatist’ accusations. So cemented into SNP ideology is this belief that Nicola Sturgeon, deputy first minister, told the Scottish Parliament’s European and external relations committee in December 2007: ‘It is the clear view of the Scottish National Party and the [Scottish] government that Scotland would automatically be a member of the European Union upon independence.’

The automaticity proposition founders on the rather obvious point that while the people and territory of Scotland may already be in the EU, the Scottish government is not. And the Scottish government being in the EU requires its votes in the European Council and other entitlements to be written into EU treaties, which can only be done with the unanimous consent of all other member states. This remains the case. The SNP, however, refuses to acknowledge this point because it raises the vision of Scotland being outside the EU and having to bang on the door begging to be allowed in out of the cold, bringing the separatist bogey back into play.

The battle against the separatist charge has had to be fought on another front – within the UK. Unionists have alleged that independence will mean that families with members on either side of the border will become fragmented, that they and commercial trade will have to negotiate border controls at Berwick and Gretna Green, that Scotland will lose access to popular BBC shows such as East Enders and Strictly Come Dancing and so on. To counter this, the SNP has devised a new strategy – that while the political union of the UK will come to an end, the social and civil union will continue and prosper. Thus families will be just as united and able to jointly celebrate such things as the Queen’s birthdays and anniversaries as she will still be the titular head of state in an independent Scotland.

Harsh economic realities, however, have forced the extension of this soft unionism into harder areas. The stresses and strains that the euro is under have made it as unattractive to Scots as it is to the English. The SNP decided some time ago that it would stick with sterling as its currency until such time as there are economic benefits to joining the euro, which would only occur after a referendum. As some 60 per cent of Scottish trade is with the rest of the UK, it makes little sense to erect a currency barrier to that trade while tearing one down to benefit the 20 per cent of Scottish trade that is with the Eurozone.

The travails of the euro and the proposed deeper integration remedies, however, demonstrate that such a currency union would erode Scotland’s fiscal independence. Proposed tax changes and government budgets would have to come under the tutelage of the (by then) foreign institutions of the UK Treasury and the Bank of England. Various unionist politicians, such as Treasury chief secretary Danny Alexander and former chancellor Alistair Darling, have argued either that the UK government simply could not countenance such an arrangement, or that the arrangements would be so restrictive as to nullify the claimed gains from political independence.

The SNP’s counter to this has been to assert a rather crude truth, that as sterling is a fully tradeable currency, the UK cannot stop Scotland from unilaterally adopting the pound. This, however, looks unsatisfactory from the point of view of independence. It leaves monetary policy, the determination of interest rates, and the operation of quantitative easing in the Bank of England’s hands. The SNP also claim, rather more vaguely, that the fiscal stability pact necessary for a currency union need not be so restrictive when, in fact, the lesson of EU struggles to stabilise the euro point to tighter rather than looser centralised fiscal controls.

This puts Salmond in the odd position of being, simultaneously, a Scottish nationalist, a European federalist, and a British unionist. He wants Scotland to have untrammelled use of its own credit card to dine at the same time in the British and European restaurants, but refuses the table d’hôte menu and insists on picking from two à la carte menus, which neither chefs seem willing to offer.

David Cameron is asking the impossible of Europe

Cameron is in only a slightly less strange place. He wants to trade heavily on his British nationalism with his domestic audience, but waves his European unionism when on the other side of the English Channel. Both audiences are, however, able to see what is being presented to the other and thus he runs the high risk of undermining his message to one by his contrary calls to the other.

In his much publicised speech on 23 January 2013, David Cameron set out his intention to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU and put the terms of that changed membership to the British people in an ‘in/out’ referendum by the end of 2017, subject to the Conservatives winning an outright majority in the general elections in 2015. His speech received global attention and a mixture of praise (e.g. those who agreed that the EU ‘needs to be reformed’) and criticism (e.g. those who disagreed with the‘language of unilateral negotiations and the threat of withdrawal’). Much of the commentary, indeed much of the speech itself, is based on the dubious premise that the UK is a major player in the European Union.

On one level, the UK undoubtedly sits at the top table: it has the third largest population and the third largest economy in the EU. However, the UK already has a different relationship with the EU than the other member states. It gets a significant rebate on its financial contributions to the EU budget; it has external borders with other EU member states; it has its own currency; it did not sign the fiscal stability treaty which requires budget prudence and introduces a debt brake for the 17 Eurozone states; and it will not (unlike 11 Eurozone states) impose a financial transaction tax which is designed to discourage speculative trading. Moreover, the UK limited the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the way in which it may be interpreted. And its red-lines approach at the IGC in 2007 means that the UK can itself decide (by 31 May 2014) whether to implement all the European measures on police and justice (which will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union) or whether to opt out of all the measures and then adopt individual measures on an ad hoc basis (subject to the consent of the other member states). Although how exactly the latter option ‘cuts red tape’ is anyone’s guess.

If this isn’t à la carte, then what is? What more does Cameron want to renegotiate? No one knows, and no one has yet produced a checklist, although the government will be working on one until the autumn of 2014. For the time being, the Working Time Directive, the European Arrest Warrant, and a better deal on fisheries keep coming up in debate. Is it realistic to argue that powers in those areas can be returned to the member states? The practical options are the following. Either the UK tries to tackle the matter from above by reducing the law-making powers of the EU institutions (that option would require a treaty change and the unanimous agreement of the other member states which is, currently, unrealistic). Or the UK tries to negotiate a better ‘deal’ for itself (e.g. through opt outs and protocols that are attached to the Treaty). But is it credible that the other member states would grant the UK special treatment when every member state is subject to aspects of EU law of which it disapproves? Overall neither option seems workable.

On a more fundamental level it seems baffling that British Euroscepticism would appear to hinge on a handful of powers that need to be ‘repatriated’. It doesn’t, and it is ludicrous to suggest that the Europhobes in the Conservative party will be placated if junior doctors work longer, and UK nationals who are wanted on charges abroad cannot be extradited (whereas, of course, UK nationals who have committed a crime in the UK but fled to another EU member state will immediately be brought back home). On fishing, where the real issue is depleted stocks through overfishing, the Commission is already transferring decision-making powers to the member states in an attempt to decentralise fishing policy and tailor it to local conditions. As Douglas Alexander put it: ‘The gap between the minimum the Tories will demand and the maximum the EU could give is unbridgeable’. These are not the fundamental issues, and any self-respecting Europhobe will not rest until the UK has exited the Union and re-attached itself to the single market like a dingy to a supertanker.

So if Cameron’s speech does not stand up to scrutiny from a European perspective, maybe its intended target was closer to home. Almost all foreign and domestic observers noted that the speech was driven primarily by domestic party politicking (the United Kingdom Independence Party – UKIP) and internecine party struggles (Bill Cash). Cameron is trying to unify a fractured party in the run-up to the general elections in 2015, and UKIP and the Tory backbenchers forced his hand. But even domestically Cameron may have dealt himself a bad hand. The offer of a referendum on renegotiated membership after the next general election is subject to two unknowns: i) the outcome of the 2015 elections; ii) the outcome of the negotiations. It is presently far from clear whether he will be successful with respect to either or both.

Until then Cameron will be seeking, not so much nouvelle cuisine as cuisine impossible, just like Salmond: untrammelled UK access to the European single market restaurant, refusal of the table d’hôte menu and insistence on the à la carte menu which is not on offer. And then he will have the nerve to ask for a rebate (i.e. other member states subsidising his dining) when presented with the bill.

Two Incoherent Policies

Cameron’s policy on the EU is just as incoherent as the SNP’s policy on continuing EU membership on current terms. Cameron assumes he will win the next election, just as Alex Salmond assumes that Scotland will automatically be an EU member state. Cameron claims that he can walk into the room and negotiate a new deal. Salmond claims that he can secure Scotland’s place in Europe on current terms: i.e. by inheriting the UK’s opt outs on the euro currency and the Schengen free travel area, which is illusory.

Moreover, a referendum (if one is to be had) needs to set out two clear choices beforehand. The in/out referendum on the EU or the Yes/No referendums on Scottish independence do not offer sufficient alternatives. What will come after EU membership? A free trade (all pay and no say) agreement with the EU like Norway? The Commonwealth? The USA? NAFTA? The global market? Splendid isolation?

Likewise, Salmond promises continuity when any EU lawyer, politician, and bureaucrat will tell him that there is no automatic right to membership of the European Union. So, what if membership is not automatic? Will Scotland stay outside the EU? Have its application fast-tracked? Join the queue of applicant states? He also promises currency continuity within a skeletonised British union, when there are an array of economists and Treasury politicians past and present saying it either will not work, or will render the gaining of political independence pointless. So what will happen then? Freelance use of the pound? Enforced joining of the euro? Invention of a Scottish currency?

The à la carte menus offered by both are, in reality, a dog’s dinner.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

About the Authors

Jo Murkens is Senior Lecturer in Law at the LSE. Dr Murkens was previously a researcher at the Constitution Unit, UCL, where he led the research on the legal, political and economic conditions and consequences of Scottish independence. Jo has taught at University College, King’s College, and Queen Mary College (all in London), and was called to the Bar in 2006.

Peter Jones is a freelance journalist, writing on Scottish current affairs for The Economist, the Times and The Scotsman. He is also, with Jo Murkens, a co-author of Scottish Independence: A Practical Guide, EUP 2001.

Measuring Leviathan: Big Government and the Myths of Public Spending | Whitehall Watch

January 31, 2013 dnmufcLeave a comment

Posted on January 14, 2013 by Colin Talbot

The political debate about public spending in the UK is bedevilled by myths and spin about how much we actually spend. So I thought it was time for a little myth-busting primer, with some pretty diagrams, about how we should be discussing public spending….

There are three main ways of measuring public spending, each of which has advantages and disadvantages.

Nominal (Cash) Spending

The first is in what is technically called the “nominal” amount spent – that is in actual cash that goes out of the Treasury coffers. Because of the effects of inflation, this nearly always rises (see Figure 1). Only twice in the past half century has the cash amount fallen – in 2000-01. It is forecast to fall again, for one year only, in 2012-13.

This is useful to some who want to argue that the State spends too much – for example some right-wing Conservative politicians and think-tanks currently claim that we are not experiencing “cuts” because the actual amount of cash being spent by the government continues to rise. Figure 1 makes it look like the State is an ever-increasing devourer of resources. But if inflation in prices is taken into account, things look a bit different.

Figure 1 Public Spending in ‘nominal (cash) terms 1965-66 to 20214-15 (£ billion)

Source: based on HM Treasury[i]

Real-Terms Spending

Real-terms spending is the amount spent with inflation taken into account.

Figure 2 Public Spending in Real-Terms (2011-12 prices)(£ billion)

Real-terms spending shows a far less dramatic increase than nominal spending, and some periods where spending levelled-off or even decreased. It shows, for example, a significant (mainly forecast) decrease in real-terms under the current Coalition government.

Again though, this way of looking at public spending can make it look like the State is a more-or-less ever expanding beast soaking up more and more of the nation’s wealth. This may, or may not be true – but the only real way of knowing is by seeing how public spending compares to nations wealth.

Spending as a proportion of GDP

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the main measure used by governments and others to estimate how wealthy countries are. There are many criticisms of GDP measurement, which we won’t go into here, but it’s the best we have at the moment for tracking growth (or lack of it) in our won economy and comparing our economic performance with other countries.

Public spending as a proportion of GDP has thus become the main, and most useful, way of tracking how much our national wealth we devote to public activities as opposed to private enterprise.

It’s main fault is obvious: because it is a ration of public spending and GDP a sudden change in GDP can easily look like a sudden change in public spending. Thus, for example, it looks like public spending suddenly sky-rocketed in the last three years of the last Labour government (see Figure 3) – whereas in fact (in real-terms – see Figure 2) it only increased slightly. The sudden change from 40.7% of GDP to 47.3% was almost entirely due to the recession the UK experienced as a result of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).

Figure 3 Public Spending as a percentage of GDP (1965-66 to 2014-15)

Public spending as a proportion of GDP has averaged just under 43% of GDP (42.76% to be more precise) for the past 50 years.

It has swung between as high as 50% (under Labour 1975-76) and as low as 35% (also under Labour in 2000-01).

But what a detailed analysis of these figures shows is that some of mythology that passes for political “facts” in Britain is just that – myth.

The first is that Labour is always the “tax and spend” Party whereas the Conservatives are far more thrifty with the public’s money.

The facts are rather more mixed (see Figure 4). It is true that the 74-79 Labour Government spent on average more, as a proportion of GDP, than any other government in the past 50 years – but this is not true for the other periods of Labour government, when Labour spent less, on average, than the Conservative (or Conservative led) governments.

In particular the widespread myth that the last “New” Labour government spent vastly more is just that – a myth. On average, even including the effects of the GFC, the last Labour government spent the least of the Governments since 1965. The myth has grown up because both Labour and their opponents wanted to promote the idea Labour spent lots. And because, especially between 2000 and 2005, Labour did rapidly increase spending – especially on health and education – but only after a period of unprecedented low spending between 1997 and 2000.

Figure 4 Public spending as percentage of GDP under different Governments (1965-2015)

This analysis only covers one aspect of public finances – spending – which is itself only one measure of how big the State is. But I hope it will help people to explain, and explore, some of the real issues about public spending rather than trading in myths and spin.

[i] All the figures used in this analysis are based on Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis (PESA), published annually by HM Treasury. The figures for 1971-72 to 2014-15 are taken from PESA 2012. For 1965-66 to 1970-71 are taken from PESA 2003. Some of the calculations are my own, based on the HMT figures.

via Measuring Leviathan: Big Government and the Myths of Public Spending | Whitehall Watch.

Accountability and transparency demand that Freedom of Information requirements should be an essential corollary of receiving public funding, throughout the whole of the NHS

January 31, 2013 dnmufcLeave a comment

Posted: 30 Jan 2013 05:15 AM PST

Changing patterns of provision for public services can have serious implications for existing standards of public accountability, converting large swathes of previously open and published information into ‘commercially confidential’ material kept secret by for-profit companies. Grahame Morris MP argues that the solution to this creeping decrease in accountability is to require that FOI rules on public disclosure apply even-handedly to all service providers within the NHS, whether they are in the public or private sectors.

In late January 2013 the Department of Health announced the formation of an expert panel within the Department advising the government on ‘Strengthening the NHS Constitution’. Replacing the older NHS Future Forum working group, this panel would “oversee the consultation on strengthening the NHS Constitution” and “develop a set of proposals to give the NHS Constitution greater traction so that patients, staff and the public are clear what to do, and who to turn to, when their expectations under the Constitution are not”. The Department also disclosed the Commercial Director of Virgin Care (that Dr Vivienne McVey), has become a member of an expert panel within the Department advising the government on ‘Strengthening the NHS Constitution’. Now Virgin Care is actively involved in bidding for lucrative NHS contracts up and down the country, and is now controversially running some NHS services in Southern England. So Dr McVey’s company is just one of a number of private companies, from home and abroad, now bidding for an estimated £7 billion of NHS contracts that have in recent months been put out to tender. In common with other private healthcare companies, Virgin Care stated in an interview to the Financial Times that it intends to make an 8 per cent profit from NHS contracts, which are financed by us, the taxpayer.

The question any reasonable observer might ask is what possible interest could Virgin Care have in ‘strengthening’ the NHS constitution, when their business model would seem to be premised on public provision performing poorly? So taxpayers and patients may justifiably ask if Virgin Care’s Commercial Director is the best person to take up this important advisory position. Most people accept that transparency is a key tenet of a strong NHS. So what might Dr McKay have to say about the current bidding practices for NHS contracts that allow commercial organisations such as Virgin Care to withhold details of those bids under the cloak of ‘commercial confidentiality’, while NHS Trusts have to reveal all and are subject to the Freedom of Information Act? Does Dr McKay and Virgin Care support the extension of the FOI Act to follow the public pound to include private medical firms running parts of our NHS?

These considerations, together with substantial support from community activists campaigning against the fragmentation and privatisation of our NHS, lead me to table a Parliamentary Early Day Motion calling for private health care companies also to be subject to the Freedom of Information Act. It has attracted the signatures of 85 MPs from 7 different parties and it has received plenty of supportive comment in the media, including in The Guardian. If you, like me believe that our NHS should not be put up for sale through secretive bidding processes, please ask your MP to sign as well. Details of the motion (known as EDM 773) are as follows:

‘That this House notes that

the most significant development that has followed from the Government’s healthcare reforms has been the 7 billion worth of new contracts being made available to the private health sector;

further notes that at least five former advisers to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are now working for lobbying firms with private healthcare clients;

recalls the Prime Minister’s own reported remarks prior to the general election when he described lobbying as `the next big scandal waiting to happen’;

recognises the growing scandal of the procurement model that favours the private health sector over the NHS, by allowing private companies to hide behind commercial confidentiality and which compromises the best practice aspirations of the public sector;

condemns the practice of revolving doors, whereby Government health advisers move to lucrative contracts in the private healthcare sector, especially at a time when the privatisation of the NHS is proceeding by stealth;

is deeply concerned at the unfair advantages being handed to private healthcare companies; and

demands that in future all private healthcare companies be subject to freedom of information requests under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in the same way as existing NHS public sector organisations’ .

Over the years there have been many campaigns launched to save our NHS, but never has there been a more important time as now, to do just that. Achieving a level playing field in bids for NHS contracts is only a start. In my own view, the next Labour Government needs to move to take the ‘for profit’ sector out of public health and our NHS, once and for all.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.

About the author

Grahame Morris MP is the Labour Member of Parliament for Easington.

Osborne’s economic strategy has failed

January 25, 2013January 25, 2013 dnmufcLeave a comment

These GDP figures are a disaster for the coalition government – politically as well as economically
When the rating agencies strip Britain of its AAA credit rating – as they almost certainly will – George Osborne’s strategy will be in complete tatters.

The strategy has failed. The public knows it. The International Monetary Fund knows it. The credit rating agencies know it. Even George Osborne knows it, although he can’t bring himself to admit as much.

Here is a brief résumé of how things stand for the economy after two and a half years with the coalition government at the helm. National output has just contracted for the fourth quarter in the last five. The only quarter of 2012 in which the economy expanded was the one that contained the London Olympics, and unfortunately for the chancellor these sort of jamborees happen once every half century rather than once every three months.

During 2012 as a whole the economy registered no growth at all. Nothing. Zilch. A big fat zero. The level of gross domestic product is 3% below where it was when the recession started, a weaker performance than during the 1930s. Royal Bank of Scotland says the four-year performance of the economy between 2008 and 2012 is the weakest since the 1930s apart from post-war mobilisations.

Industrial production was to blame for the drop in output in the final three months of 2012, with factory output back to levels last seen in the early 1990s. Rebalancing is a pipedream. Unsurprisingly, the Treasury’s deficit reduction programme is well off track. This is an abysmal record.

Sure, there are all sorts of excuses that can be trotted out to explain away the fact that three years after the recession first ended GDP is still contracting. The crisis in the eurozone hasn’t helped. Rising commodity prices have raised business costs and acted as a brake on consumer spending.

But the government also sucked demand out of the economy by raising taxes, cutting welfare and by taking the axe to capital spending programmes. The blood-curdling rhetoric from Osborne in 2010 about Britain being a Greece in waiting had the entirely predictable effect of shredding consumer and business confidence.

So what happens next? Clearly, there is a risk that the first quarter of 2013 will also be negative. The economy is fundamentally weak and the heavy snow of the past week will not have helped.

Against this backdrop, there will be mounting pressure for further steps to get the economy moving. Ideally, action would come from the chancellor himself in the budget in the form of tax cuts and higher spending on small-scale infrastructure projects that can be started immediately.

In reality, changes to fiscal policy are likely to be small scale and cosmetic. Osborne will rely, as he has for the past two and a half years, on the Bank of England to do the heavy lifting. Further monetary easing looks inevitable, even though a combination of 0.5% bank rate and £375bn of quantitative easing has proved ineffective until now.

Politically as well as economically, these figures are a disaster for the government. It ensures the next few months will be spent debating whether the UK is heading for a triple dip and how soon the credit rating agencies will strip Britain of its AAA credit rating. When that happens – as it almost certainly will – Osborne’s strategy will be in complete tatters.