CULTURES OF WORKLESSNESS – WE NEED TO FOCUS ON WORK, NOT WELFARE

It’s popular for politicians to talk about generations of the same family that have never worked. But, as Rob MacDonald explains, research shows this is misleading.

The real problems of ‘in-work poverty’ and ‘underemployment’ are finally making some headlines, elbowing their way into the usual discourse about welfare to work and benefit dependency. Yet the idea of a culture of worklessness – values, attitudes and behaviours that prefer welfare dependency to employment – remains influential and widely held. Politicians, policy makers and welfare practitioners talk confidently of ‘three generations of families where no-one has ever worked’.

A new study for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation tested these ideas. The aim was to see whether cultures of worklessness helped explain long-term unemployment in families across generations.

We undertook concerted, intensive fieldwork in very deprived neighbourhoods of Glasgow and Middlesbrough but we were unable to locate any families with three generations who had never worked. If such families exist, they can only account for a minuscule fraction of workless people. Recent surveys suggest that less than one per cent of workless households might have two generations who have never worked. Families with three such generations will therefore be even fewer.

Next, we undertook lengthy, life history interviews with 20 families with long-term worklessness across two generations. Even locating these families was very challenging. So, what did we find?

• There was no evidence of a ‘culture of worklessness’. Families remained committed to the value of work and would have preferred to be in jobs rather than have ‘the miserable existence’ of a life on benefits.
• Workless parents were unanimous in not wanting their children to end up in the same situation as themselves and actively tried to help them find jobs.
• Working-age children remained strongly committed to conventional values about work as part of a normal transition to adulthood. They were keen to avoid the poverty, worklessness and other problems experienced by their parents.
• The long-term worklessness of parents in these families was a result of the impact of complex problems (particularly related to ill-health) associated with living in long-term and deep poverty. As one interviewee asked, ‘how can you work when you have a life like mine?’ In an already tight labour market, multiple problems combined to place people at the back of a long queue for jobs.

If we cannot find a ‘culture of worklessness’ here, amongst these extreme cases of very long-term unemployed families, we are unlikely to find it anywhere. Politicians and policy-makers need to abandon theories – and policies flowing from them – that see worklessness as primarily the outcome of a culture of worklessness, held in families and passed down the generations. This returns us to our starting point. The real challenge is creating opportunities for work – jobs that help people escape from poverty and insecurity.

Poverty and Insecurity: life in low-pay, no-pay Britain is published this week by Policy Press. TO FOCUS ON WORK, NOT WELFARE

It’s popular for politicians to talk about generations of the same family that have never worked. But, as Rob MacDonald explains, research shows this is misleading.

The real problems of ‘in-work poverty’ and ‘underemployment’ are finally making some headlines, elbowing their way into the usual discourse about welfare to work and benefit dependency. Yet the idea of a culture of worklessness – values, attitudes and behaviours that prefer welfare dependency to employment – remains influential and widely held. Politicians, policy makers and welfare practitioners talk confidently of ‘three generations of families where no-one has ever worked’.

A new study for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation tested these ideas. The aim was to see whether cultures of worklessness helped explain long-term unemployment in families across generations.

We undertook concerted, intensive fieldwork in very deprived neighbourhoods of Glasgow and Middlesbrough but we were unable to locate any families with three generations who had never worked. If such families exist, they can only account for a minuscule fraction of workless people. Recent surveys suggest that less than one per cent of workless households might have two generations who have never worked. Families with three such generations will therefore be even fewer.

Next, we undertook lengthy, life history interviews with 20 families with long-term worklessness across two generations. Even locating these families was very challenging. So, what did we find?

• There was no evidence of a ‘culture of worklessness’. Families remained committed to the value of work and would have preferred to be in jobs rather than have ‘the miserable existence’ of a life on benefits.
• Workless parents were unanimous in not wanting their children to end up in the same situation as themselves and actively tried to help them find jobs.
• Working-age children remained strongly committed to conventional values about work as part of a normal transition to adulthood. They were keen to avoid the poverty, worklessness and other problems experienced by their parents.
• The long-term worklessness of parents in these families was a result of the impact of complex problems (particularly related to ill-health) associated with living in long-term and deep poverty. As one interviewee asked, ‘how can you work when you have a life like mine?’ In an already tight labour market, multiple problems combined to place people at the back of a long queue for jobs.

If we cannot find a ‘culture of worklessness’ here, amongst these extreme cases of very long-term unemployed families, we are unlikely to find it anywhere. Politicians and policy-makers need to abandon theories – and policies flowing from them – that see worklessness as primarily the outcome of a culture of worklessness, held in families and passed down the generations. This returns us to our starting point. The real challenge is creating opportunities for work – jobs that help people escape from poverty and insecurity.

Poverty and Insecurity: life in low-pay, no-pay Britain is published this week by Policy Press.
Joseph rowntree foundation

Manchester is ranked in the top ten authorities worst hit by Government cuts, according to new figures.

Labour have accused the Government of targeting the country’s most deprived areas to reduce spending, while protecting affluent regions.

Analysis released by the party suggests that the north of England and inner-city parts of London are taking the brunt of the cuts to welfare and local councils.

The figures amount to an average of £508 cuts for every person in the North West, £566 in the North East, and £511 in the capital.

This is compared to just £292 in the South East outside London and £324 in the east of England.

Manchester is the seventh hardest hit authority in terms of cuts, despite being ranked fourth highest in the Government’s own deprivation figures, according to Labour’s figures.

The worst-hit area, Knowsley in Merseyside, sees a total loss of £850 per head – £515 per head in welfare cuts and £336 in local government cuts.

By contrast, the least-hit area, Mole Valley – which covers the towns of Dorking and Leatherhead and surrounding villages in Surrey – loses £182 per head, made up of £164 in welfare reductions and £18 in local government cuts.

The list of ten local authority areas hardest hit by the cuts includes seven out of the eight most disadvantaged parts of the country, according to the Government’s own deprivation index.

Knowsley, which ranks fifth in the index, is followed by Westminster (87th in the index, losing £824 per head), then Hackney in east London (second in the deprivation index, £821), Liverpool (first, £817), Blackpool (sixth, £792), Hartlepool (24th, £724), Manchester (fourth, £715), Newham in east London (third, £710) and Middlesbrough (eighth, £696).

Mole Valley is 310th out of 326 in the deprivation index, and the other areas on which the cuts are having least impact are equally well-off. Second least-affected is Waverley in Surrey (321st on the index, losing £187 a head), Wokingham in Berkshire (325th, £189), Hart in Hampshire (326th, £194) and Elmbridge in Surrey (320th, £196).

Shadow work and pensions secretary Liam Byrne said: “The Tories are zeroing in on areas in need and hitting them hard – twice.

“Communities facing the biggest hit to local government are also losing most from cuts to their tax credits and benefits, yet instead of helping working families the Tories are giving millionaires a tax cut. That tells you everything you need to know about this Government’s priorities.”

According to Labour’s figures, based on independent research conducted by Sheffield Hallam University and Newcastle City Council, the overall loss per head from welfare and local government cuts is £566 in the North-East, £511 in London, £508 in the North-West, £421 in Yorkshire and the Humber, £388 in the West Midlands, £364 in the East Midlands, £334 in the South-West, £324 in the East of England and £292 in the South-East.

See Map – http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/manchester-one-worst-hit-places-government-2995627

Conservative claims about benefits are not just spin, they’re making it up

Government ministers like Iain Duncan Smith and Grant Shapps are misrepresenting official statistics for political gain

Declan Gaffney and Jonathan Portes
guardian.co.uk, Monday 15 April 2013 15.32 BST

Conservative minister Grant Shapps has quoted a misleading statistic about the number of people on incapacity benefit dropping their claims as evidence of a broken welfare system. Photograph: Richard Sellers/Allstar/Sportsphoto Ltd
In the past three weeks, readers of mainstream UK newspapers have learned a number of things about the UK social security system and those who rely on it. They have learned that 878,000 claimants have left employment and support allowance (ESA) to avoid a tough new medical assessment; that thousands have rushed to make claims for disability living allowance (DLA) before a new, more rigorous, assessment is put in place; and that one in four of those set to be affected by the government’s benefit cap have moved into work in response to the policy. These stories have a number of things in common. Each is based on an official statistic. Each tells us about how claimants have responded to welfare policy changes. Each includes a statement from a member of the government. And each is demonstrably inaccurate.

When we say inaccurate, we are choosing our words carefully. Politicians are inevitably selective in the data they choose to publicise, picking the figures that best suit whatever story they want to tell. This can mean that stories that are technically accurate can nonetheless be potentially misleading. Within reasonable limits that is in itself neither improper nor unethical: indeed, it is virtually unavoidable. But here are some examples that are not just misleading: they assert that official government statistics say things they do not.

First, the claim that “more than a third [878,000] of people who were on incapacity benefit [who] dropped their claims rather than complete a medical assessment, according to government figures. A massive 878,300 chose not to be checked for their fitness to work [our italics].” For the Conservative party chairman, Grant Shapps, the figures “demonstrate how the welfare system was broken under Labour and why our reforms are so important”.

In fact, every month, of the roughly 43,000 people who leave ESA, about 20,000 have not yet undergone a work capability assessment (WCA); a number that over four years or so adds up to the headline 878,000. There is no mystery about this: there is an inevitable gap between applying for the benefit and undertaking the WCA. During that time, many people will see an improvement in their condition and/or will return to work (whether or not their condition improves). DWP research has shown that overwhelmingly these factors explain why people drop their claims before the WCA; it also showed that it was extremely rare for claimants not to attend a WCA. In stating, in effect, that official figures showed the opposite of this, the story was simply wrong.

Iain Duncan Smith’s assertion about a surge in DLA claims turns on the fact that DLA is being abolished for new claims and replaced with a new benefit, personal independence payment (PIP), for which most claimants will require a face-to-face assessment (for DLA, other forms of medical evidence could be used to support claims). He said: “We’ve seen a rise [in claims] in the run-up to PIP. And you know why? They know PIP has a health check. They want to get in early, get ahead of it. It’s a case of ‘get your claim in early’.”

Some very specific figures were cited: “In the north-east of England, where reforms to disability benefits are being introduced, there was an increase of 2,600 in claims over the last year, up from 1,700 the year before, the minister told the Daily Mail. In the north-west, there were 4,100 claims for the benefits over the past 12 months, more than double the 1,800 in the previous year, he said.”

But these figures, to be found on DWP’s website, in fact represent the change – successful new claims minus those leaving the benefit – in the total DLA caseload from August 2011 to August 2012, crucially including pensioners and children who are not affected by the change from DLA to PIP. They do not constitute even indicative evidence of a DLA “closing down sale”. So what happens if we look at new claims, or indeed the total caseload, for those (between 16 and 64) who will be actually affected by the change? In fact, both fell, in both regions, between those two dates. These falls – well within the normal quarterly variation – tell us little, except to show conclusively that Duncan Smith’s statements are supported by no evidence that he has offered whatsoever.

Finally, the coalition’s flagship “benefit cap”. On this occasion, not only did Duncan Smith misrepresent what his own department’s statistics meant, but he chose to directly contradict his own statisticians, claiming: “Already we’ve seen 8,000 people who would have been affected by the cap move into jobs. This clearly demonstrates that the cap is having the desired impact.”

But the official DWP analysis, from which the 8,000 figure is drawn, not only does not say this, it says the direct opposite: “The figures for those claimants moving into work cover all of those who were identified as potentially being affected by the benefit cap who entered work. It is not intended to show the additional numbers entering work as a direct result of the contact [their emphasis].”

As DWP analysts know only too well, people move off benefits into work all the time. Unless it is shown that these flows have increased for those affected, and by more for them than for other claimants – and no such analysis has yet been published, either by DWP or anybody else – we know nothing about whether the policy has had any impact (this claim is now being reviewed by the UK statistics authority).

None of this should be taken as comment on the merits of the policies in question. But these misrepresentations of official statistics cross a line between legitimate “spin”, where a government selects the data that best supports its case, and outright inaccuracy.

Public cynicism about official statistics is often misplaced – the UK, like most democracies, strictly limits the ability of governments to influence the production and dissemination of official data, often, no doubt, to the frustration of ministers. These restrictions on what government can do with official data are an unsung but essential element in modern democratic governance. When government seeks to get around these limitations by, in effect, simply making things up, this is not just an issue for geeks, wonks and pedants – it’s an issue for everyone.

• This article was amended on 19 April 2013. The original said 130,000 people leave employment and support allowance every month; that is in fact how many people leave ESA each quarter.

Tony Blair: Labour must search for answers and not merely aspire to be a repository for people’s anger

The centre has not shifted to the left, says Tony Blair. Labour must resist the easy option of tying itself to those forces whose anti-Tory shouts are loudest. 

The paradox of the financial crisis is that, despite being widely held to have been caused by under-regulated markets, it has not brought a decisive shift to the left. But what might happen is that the left believes such a shift has occurred and behaves accordingly. The risk, which is highly visible here in Britain, is that the country returns to a familiar left/right battle. The familiarity is because such a contest dominated the 20th century. The risk is because in the 21st century such a contest debilitates rather than advances the nation.

This is at present crystallising around debates over austerity, welfare, immigration and Europe. Suddenly, parts of the political landscape that had been cast in shadow for some years, at least under New Labour and the first years of coalition government, are illuminated in sharp relief. The Conser­vative Party is back clothing itself in the mantle of fiscal responsibility, buttressed by moves against “benefit scroungers”, immigrants squeezing out British workers and – of course – Labour profligacy.

The Labour Party is back as the party opposing “Tory cuts”, highlighting the cruel consequences of the Conservative policies on welfare and representing the disadvantaged and vulnerable (the Lib Dems are in a bit of a fix, frankly).

For the Conservatives, this scenario is less menacing than it seems. They are now going to inspire loathing on the left. But they’re used to that. They’re back on the old territory of harsh reality, tough decisions, piercing the supposed veil of idealistic fantasy that prevents the left from governing sensibly. Compassionate Conservatism mat­tered when compassion was in vogue. But it isn’t now. Getting the house in order is.

For Labour, the opposite is true. This scenario is more menacing than it seems. The ease with which it can settle back into its old territory of defending the status quo, allying itself, even anchoring itself, to the interests that will passionately and often justly oppose what the government is doing, is so apparently rewarding, that the exercise of political will lies not in going there, but in resisting the temptation to go there.

So where should progressive politics position itself, not just in Britain but in Europe as a whole? How do we oppose smartly and govern sensibly?

The guiding principle should be that we are the seekers after answers, not the repository for people’s anger. In the first case, we have to be dispassionate even when the issues arouse great passion. In the second case, we are simple fellow-travellers in sympathy; we are not leaders. And in these times, above all, people want leadership.

So, for Britain, start with an analysis of where we stand as a country. The financial crisis has not created the need for change; it has merely exposed it. Demographics – the age profile of our population – technology and globalisation all mean that the systems we created post-1945 have to change radically. This is so, irrespective of the financial catastrophe of 2008 and its aftermath.

Labour should be very robust in knocking down the notion that it “created” the crisis. In 2007/2008 the cyclically adjusted current Budget balance was under 1 per cent of GDP. Public debt was significantly below 1997. Over the whole 13 years, the debt-to-GDP ratio was better than the Conservative record from 1979-97. Of course there is a case for saying a tightening around 2005 would have been more prudent. But the effect of this pales into insignificance compared to the financial tsunami that occurred globally, starting with the sub-prime mortgage debacle in the US.

However, the crisis has occurred and no one can get permission to govern unless they deal with its reality. The more profound point is: even if it hadn’t happened, the case for fundamental reform of the postwar state is clear. For example:

What is driving the rise in housing benefit spending, and if it is the absence of housing, how do we build more?

 How do we improve the skillset of those who are unemployed when the shortage of skills is the clearest barrier to employment?

 How do we take the health and education reforms of the last Labour government to a new level, given the huge improvement in results they brought about?

 What is the right balance between universal and means-tested help for pensioners?

How do we use technology to cut costs and drive change in our education, health, crime and immigration systems?

 How do we focus on the really hard core of socially excluded families, separating them from those who are just temporarily down on their luck?

 What could the developments around DNA do to cut crime?

There are another 20 such questions, but they all involve this approach: a root-and-branch inquiry, from first principles, into where we spend money, and why.

On the economy, we should have one simple test: what produces growth and jobs? There is roughly $1trn (£650bn) of UK corporate reserves. What would give companies the confidence to invest it? What does a modern industrial strategy look like? How do we rebuild the financial sector? There is no need to provide every bit of detail. People don’t expect it. But they want to know where we’re coming from because that is a clue as to where we would go, if elected.

Sketch out the answers to these questions and you have a vision of the future. For progressives, that is of the absolute essence. The issue isn’t, and hasn’t been for at least 50 years, whether we believe in social justice. The issue is how progressive politics fulfils that mission as times, conditions and objective realities change around us. Having such a modern vision elevates the debate. It helps avoid the danger of tactical victories that lead to strategic defeats.

It means, for example, that we don’t tack right on immigration and Europe, and tack left on tax and spending. It keeps us out of our comfort zone but on a centre ground that is ultimately both more satisfying and more productive for party and country.

You are invited to read this free preview of the upcoming centenary issue of the New Statesman, out on 11 April. 

http://newstatesman100.tumblr.com/post/47687650241/tony-blair-labour-must-search-for-answers-and-not